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Abstract
The public sector has grown dramatically over the past few centuries in
many developed countries. In this paper, we use wavelet methods to
distinguish between two leading explanations for this growth—Wagner’s
law and the displacement effect. In doing so, we use the long-term data
of ten OECD countries for a maximum time span of 1800–2009. We find
that the validity of Wagner’s law is likely to vary strongly over time for
each country. A roughly similar feature in most of the countries is that
the law is less valid in the earliest stage of economic development as well
as in the advanced stages, with the validity tending to follow an inverted
U-shaped pattern with economic development. Further, our results indi-
cate that the long-run growth of government size cannot be adequately
explained by Wagner’s law. On the other hand, the displacement effect
appears to account for the bulk of the growth in most of the countries.
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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that the public sector has grown dramatically over the past
few centuries in many developed countries. Multiple theories of government size in
the long run have been propounded to explain this.
One of the leading hypotheses is the so-called Wagner’s law of increasing state
activity, the oldest hypothesis in the literature.1 The law has been tested for nu-
merous countries and time spans.2 However, empirical evidence of the law is mixed
across countries and periods and we are yet to systematically understand the law.
One probable reason for these inconsistent results is that earlier studies gave scant
attention to structural changes. In fact, only a handful of recent studies such as
Durevall and Henrekson (2011) and Kuckuck (2014) emphasize that the validity of
the law evolves over time.
Durevall and Henrekson (2011) analyze long historical data since the early 19th
century for Sweden and the United Kingdom and point out that Wagner’s law can be
confirmed in both countries only during the middle of the long sample period (from
roughly 1860 to the mid-1970s). In other words, they find no evidence of the law
before 1860 and after the mid-1970s. Their findings suggest that the validity of the
law follows an inverted U-shaped pattern over time. Subsequently, Kuckuck (2014)
also uses historical data from the mid-19th century for five western European coun-
tries (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Italy) and finds that
the law does not hold in advanced economies but does hold in developing economies.
Besides supporting the findings of Durevall and Henrekson (2011), Kuckuck (2014)
highlights the relevance of each country’s stage of economic development.
Similar results are presented by Lamartina and Zaghini (2011), who use a panel
data of 23 OECD countries for the period 1970–2006 and find that Wagner’s law is
more valid when the GDP per capita is low than when it is sufficiently high. More
importantly, the authors identify a remarkable decline in long-run elasticity between
GDP and public spending in a short period from 1990 to 2006. Thus, although
1For example, trade openness, country size, ethnic fragmentation, and income inequality are the
other leading factors or determinants of government size. See, for example, Meltzer and Richard
(1981), North and Wallis (1982), and Shelton (2007) for a detailed survey of the other leading
hypotheses.
2The law was initially tested by Lall (1969) and then analyzed by Mann (1980), Singh and Sahni
(1984), and Abizadeh and Gray (1985). See, for example, Thornton (1999) for results of Europe,
Iyare and Lorde (2004) for Caribbean countries, and Akitoby et al. (2006) for the developing
countries. Chow et al. (2002) suggest that controlling for the effects of money supply is crucial
for the validity of Wagner’s law. Bru¨ckner et al. (2012) use oil price shocks as an instrument
variable and estimate the permanent income elasticity of government expenditure. While most
earlier studies use national-level data, an exception is Narayan et al. (2012), who investigate the
law for Indian states.
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Durevall and Henrekson (2011) demonstrate at most only two structural breaks
during the centuries studied, the potential for more local changes does exist over
several decades. In summary, these recent studies seem to provide some systematic
evidence, but the continuing challenge for the literature is to identify when the law
is operational.
Another leading hypothesis of long-run growth of government size is the displace-
ment effect proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), who examine the long-run
government expenditure in the United Kingdom. According to them, taxation is
stable in normal periods, but the burden of taxation increases in order to finance
government expenditure in times of crisis, for example, during wars, and the higher
budgetary levels continue even after the crisis. Thus, the sudden increase in gov-
ernment expenditure in a crisis does not return to the level prior to the crisis, and
the government size tends to exhibit stepwise increases through crises, as depicted
in Figure 1.3
In this paper, we distinguish between Wagner’s law and the displacement ef-
fect and provide new insight into the existing literature. To better understand the
findings of Durevall and Henrekson (2011) and Kuckuck (2014), we also use the
long-term data of ten OECD countries for a maximum time span of 1800–2009.
This study differs from all previous studies in the following two respects.
First, this is the first study to compare the above two hypotheses. While previous
studies have tested each hypothesis separately, they did not try to examine which
hypothesis is more supported, but our primary objective is to determine which
hypothesis seems more plausible. Second, to accomplish this goal, we utilize wavelet
methods.4 As detailed in Section 3, this method is useful to decompose variables by
frequency and can extract the long-run information commonly considered relevant
to both Wagner’s law and the displacement effect. In addition, wavelet analysis
allows for the identification of possible breaks around each time and frequency.
Especially, this study is based on historical data and the sample covers periods of
large social disturbances, for example, World War I, World War II, and the Great
Depression. For an appraisal of the displacement effect and Wagner’s law, we need
3Compared with the Wagner’s law literature, few studies, for example, Goff (1998) and Legrenzi
(2004), test the displacement effect.
4To test the law, Lamartina and Zaghini (2011), Durevall and Henrekson (2011), Kuckuck
(2014), and many others adopt some cointegration analysis methods. Formal structural break
tests using the cointegration approach require a certain sample size and might overlook minute
breaks that occur frequently. On the other hand, our wavelet approach allows for a local time-
varying relationship between government size and economic development and can detect breaks
even if they repeat frequently. Kuckuck (2014) examines the structural changes of the law for
previously divided subsample periods with each country’s stage of economic development, but we
try to endogenously detect structural changes if any.
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to eliminate their effect on government expenditure in the short to medium term.
Although these disturbances are considered hard to handle in previous econometric
techniques, given that their effects are relatively transient, we can exclude them by
using the wavelet method.
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, the displacement effect
of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) seems to have an important role in explaining a
large part of the growth of the public sector in most of the countries. Second, the
validity of Wagner’s law tends to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern with economic
development. This is consistent with Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for Sweden
and the United Kingdom and is new evidence for the other countries. That is, our
analysis supports the view that Wagner’s law is less validated in advanced economic
stages, as suggested by Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) and Kuckuck (2014), and that
the validity is weak in the earliest stages of economic development in most of the
OECD countries. Third, in fact, the extent to which the law is operational changes
more frequently than shown by previous studies. This changing validity of the law
also points to the possibility that the mixed results in earlier studies could be due to
disregarding the structural changes accompanying each country’s stage of economic
development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
used for this empirical analysis and overviews Wagner’s law and the displacement
effect. Section 3 explains our empirical framework and presents our empirical results.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Government size, economic development, and
data
Studies in the literature test the displacement effect by investigating government
size and verify Wagner’s law by exploring the relationship between government size
and economic development. However, according to a review by Peacock and Scott
(2000), previous empirical studies dealing with Wagner’s law use different measures
for government size and economic development. One of the most commonly used
representations is based on Musgrave (1969), who interprets the law as implying
that the share of total government expenditure in GDP increases with per capita
income (e.g., Lall, 1969; Mann, 1980; Ram, 1987; Islam, 2001; Chang, 2002; Chang
et al., 2004; Shelton, 2007; Durevall and Henrekson, 2011). In regression formula,
the specification can be represented as
GY = α + β(PCY ), (1)
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where GY is the share of government expenditure in GDP and PCY is the real per
capita GDP.5 In line with this thinking, we adopt GY as proxy for government size
and PCY as proxy for economic development, and interpret the law as a positive
effect of the latter on the former. Note that following many previous works, we
transform both variables to the natural logarithmic form in this study.
As explained in the Introduction section, we need long historical data for as
many countries as possible for our present work. Only recently, by assuming the
Musgrave version of the law (or the above-mentioned two variables), the historical
data for many countries could be obtained for a maximum period of approximately
two centuries. Thus, we obtain annual observations for two series from recent studies,
that is, GY from Mauro et al. (2013), and PCY from Barro and Ursu´a (2008).6
Using the historical data of five western European countries, Kuckuck (2014)
shows that Wagner’s law is more valid when the GDP per capita is low than when
it is sufficiently high. Given the World Bank’s income group definitions, Kuckuck
(2014) considers three development stages: (1) the “lower middle income stage”
when the GDP per capita is less than 3,500 Int$, (2) the “upper middle income
stage” when the GDP per capita is between 3,500 and 12,000 Int$, and (3) the
“high income stage” when the GDP per capita is above 12,000 Int$. For comparison,
following Kuckuck (2014), we refer to the same three development stages.7
Our dataset covers the following ten OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. All the sample periods end in 2009, starting from as far back as possible. The
list of countries, the corresponding periods, and the three development stages are
reported in Table 1. As mentioned above, to evaluate the law at each development
stage from an historical perspective, we need a long time span. Thus, the criterion
for selecting the ten OECD countries is that their number of observations exceed 100
and the sample period be at least throughout the 20th century. An exceptionally
selected country is Mexico. This is because a re-examination for Mexico appeared
useful after some authors examined the law for Mexico among others. When defining
the high income stage of the United States in accordance with Kuckuck’s criterion,
the threshold could be 1944, because the GDP per capita in the United States
reached 12,000 Int$ temporarily in 1944 following a steep increase during World War
5See, for example, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for why this specification appears proper
when testing the law.
6The former data can be found on the website of International Monetary Fund
(https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40222.0), and the latter, on Robert
Barro’s website (http://rbarro.com/data-sets/).
7Lall (1969) also focuses on development stages. While Kuckuck (2014) and this study rely on
time series data, Lall (1969) analyzes the cross-sectional 1962–1964 averages data for 46 developing
countries using per capita GNP to divide the countries into three income groups.
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II. However, since it remained below 12,000 Int$ from 1945 to 1962, the threshold
is defined as 1963, as reported in Table 1.
Before proceeding to our formal analysis, we overview the dynamics of GY and
PCY over the last centuries in Figure 2. The shaded areas in the figure depict
the above-mentioned three development stages (lower middle income, upper middle
income, and high income). While generally both GY and PCY rise dramatically
through the whole period in all countries, a few remarkable features can be observed.
First, large social and economic disturbances, such as World War I, World War
II, and the Great Depression, have an extraordinary influence on GY and PCY in
some countries in the short to medium term. Major peaks occur for GY in periods
covering the two world wars. For the United States and some other countries, PCY
falls in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Note that in the light of the long-
run behavior, the level of GY remains much greater after the wars than immediately
before the wars. This is consistent with the displacement effect proposed by Peacock
and Wiseman (1961). As detailed in Section 3, the present wavelet methods enable
us to exclude the short-run effects but capture the changing long-run behavior of
GY .
Second, following the exclusion of Chile and Mexico, for whom the data of the
high income stage are not available, GY shows little change in the latter part of the
high income stage, unlike earlier, whereas PCY increases during the same period.
A similar pattern appears for Chile from the latter part of the upper middle income
stage to the early phase of the high income stage. Although this is not evident for
Mexico, we confirm a small deviation between the two series in the latter part of
the upper middle income stage. Thus, we observe that the spread between PCY
and GY broadens in the recent decades in all countries, although some differences
between the countries exist in timing and duration.
These simple visual results are consistent with the formal evidence for Swe-
den and the United Kingdom found by Durevall and Henrekson (2011), and for
the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Italy as shown by Kuckuck
(2014). They also provide new evidence for the other countries, and we conjecture
weak support for the law in recent decades in most countries.
Moreover, a comparison between the OECD countries indicates the possibility of
country-specific timing. Durevall and Henrekson (2011) conclude that the law does
not hold after roughly the mid-1970s for Sweden and the United Kingdom, but the
timing seems uneven for the other countries. For example, for the United States
in Figure 2, the deviation between PCY and GY for long-run movements appears
to begin somewhere around the onset of the high income stage. In this connection,
except for Chile and Mexico, the high income stages based on Kuckuck’s (2014)
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criterion coincide roughly with the recent period of different evolutions of the two
series. However, from Figure 2, the breaks are not necessarily formed in strict
accordance with the onset of high income stages.
Third, except for Australia, for whom the lower middle income stage data are not
available, while PCY rises during part of the lower middle income stage, GY exhibits
low growth in the corresponding period. This indicates the possibility of Durevall
and Henrekson’s (2011) suggestion holding true in the earliest stage of economic
development for not only Sweden and the United Kingdom but also for the other
countries. While the authors argue that the law does not hold before roughly 1860
for Sweden and the United Kingdom, the timing of the breaks in other countries
looks unlikely to be the same. Moreover, such breaks can hardly be expected to be
only around the threshold year dividing the periods between the lower and upper
middle income stages.
3 Time-frequency analysis
3.1 Methods and motivation
In this subsection, we briefly explain how to detect the displacement effect and
the changing validity of Wagner’s law over the centuries using wavelet analysis.
Following Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012) and Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014), we
outline our wavelet tools below.
To begin with, we consider the basic functions called wavelet daughters ψ˜, which
are obtained by scaling and translating the mother wavelet ψ:
ψ˜τ,s(t) =
1√
|s|
ψ
(
t− τ
s
)
, s, τ ∈ R, s 6= 0, (2)
where s is the scaling factor determining the width of the wavelet and concerns
frequency, 1/
√
|s| is the normalization factor, and τ is the translation parameter
determining the wavelet location in time. If |s| is less (more) than 1, the wavelet
is compressed (stretched). Note that, as specified below, the mother wavelet ψ is
chosen to be a complex-valued function.
The continuous wavelet transform of a time series x(t) can be described as
Wx(τ, s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
x(t)ψ˜∗τ,s(t)dt, (3)
where the asterisk denotes complex conjugation. Note that wavelet transformWx(τ, s)
is considered complex-valued because ψ is assumed to be a complex-valued function,
as already mentioned.
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Regarding the mother wavelet for continuous wavelet transform, we follow pre-
vious studies in the literature such as Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012), Rua (2012),
Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014), Marczak and Go´mez (2015), and many others,
and assume the Morlet wavelet for ω0 > 5 such that
ψω0(t) = pi
−1/4eiω0te−t
2/2. (4)
Here, pi−1/4 is the normalization factor ensuring unit energy of the wavelet, i is
an imaginary unit (i.e., i =
√−1), and ω0 is the parameter determining frequency
within the Gaussian envelope. In practice, to the best of our knowledge, all previous
economic studies assume ω0 = 6, because the scaling factor s is approximately equal
to the frequencies when ω0 = 6. Following the previous works, we also set ω0 to be
6 in this study.
The amplitude of the wavelet transform can be a useful tool to measure the
contribution to the variance of series x(t) around each time and frequency. That is,
from the amplitude of the wavelet transform, the wavelet power spectrum can be
given by
WPSx(τ, s) = |Wx(τ, s)|2. (5)
Unlike the classic power spectrum based on the Fourier transform, WPSx(τ, s) indi-
cates how the strength of the time series x(t) is distributed in the frequency domain
as well as in the time domain.
In order to assess Wagner’s law, we need to explore the relationship between
government size (GY ) and the long-run real per capita GDP (PCY ). To explain
the implementation of this exploration, we consider two time series, denoted by x(t)
and y(t). The cross wavelet transform for the two series is defined as
Wxy(τ, s) = Wx(τ, s)W
∗
y (τ, s).
This complex-valued transform yields the following two useful measures.
The first measure is wavelet coherency; this is based on the amplitude |Wxy(τ, s)|,
defined as
Rxy(τ, s) =
|S(Wxy(τ, s))|√
S(|Wxx(τ, s)|)S(|Wyy(τ, s)|)
, (6)
where S is a smoothing operator in both time and frequency. In an analogy with the
well-known correlation coefficient, one can interpret wavelet coherency as a localized
correlation coefficient over time (reflected by τ) and across frequencies (reflected by
s). Note that Rxy(τ, s) is calculated as an absolute value and hence cannot be less
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than 0 or more than 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ Rxy(τ, s) ≤ 1).
The second measure is the phase difference between x and y, ρxy, which is
obtained from the phase angle of the cross wavelet transform
ρxy(τ, s) = tan
−1
[
Im{Wxy(τ, s)}
Re{Wxy(τ, s)}
]
,
with ρxy ∈ [−pi, pi], where Re and Im denote respectively the real and imaginary
parts. The phase difference provides information about whether the variables are
leading or lagging at the specified time and frequency. Following Aguiar-Conraria
et al. (2012), Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014), and many others, we summarize
the various possibilities of ρxy as follows. When ρxy ∈ (−pi/2, pi/2), x and y move
in phase (positive correlation) because ρx and ρy have nearly the same value with
a small phase difference. In particular, if ρxy = 0 (i.e., ρx = ρy), we infer that
x and y move exactly together and are completely and positively correlated; if
ρxy ∈ (0, pi/2), x leads y because ρx is slightly larger than ρy and the phase of x is
leading; and if ρxy ∈ (−pi/2, 0), y leads x. On the other hand, when ρxy ∈ (pi/2, pi) or
ρxy ∈ (−pi,−pi/2), x and y move out of phase (negative correlation). In particular, if
ρxy = pi or ρxy = −pi, they move in anti-phase. In this case, x and y are completely
and negatively correlated. If ρxy ∈ (−pi,−pi/2), x leads y. This is because y falls
(rises) after x rises (falls), thus indicating a negative relationship between x and y,
with x leading. Finally, if ρxy ∈ (pi/2, pi), y leads x.
In our applications, both these measures derived from the cross wavelet trans-
form are useful to test Wagner’s law. The wavelet coherency between GY and PCY ,
RGY,PCY , indicates when the relationship between the two is strong. Note, impor-
tantly, that we cannot evaluate the validity of the law only from RGY,PCY . Assuming
that PCY determines GY , as modeled in (1) in previous works, PCY should be
positively correlated with GY and should lead GY (i.e., ρGY,PCY ∈ (−pi/2, 0)). In
summary, as a measure of testing Wagner’s law, wavelet coherency makes sense only
if the phase difference between GY and PCY is between −pi/2 and 0.
Furthermore, a comparison of the wavelet power spectrum of government size,
WPSGY , and the wavelet coherency between GY and PCY , RGY,PCY , is useful to
identify whether Wagner’s law or the displacement effect is crucial to explain long-
run government growth. If Wagner’s law is relevant to the growth in GY , then the
significant regions of RGY,PCY with PCY leading coincide with those of WPSGY in
the time-frequency space. In contrast, if the displacement effect plays a significant
role in explaining the growth, such coincidences are not expected and the long-run
increase around the period of crisis should show up as an upward shift in WPSGY
at lower frequencies.
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Before presenting the results, we need to mention that the continuous wavelet
transform of a finite-length time series yields border distortions. Like other trans-
forms, the transformed values at the edges of sample periods are incorrectly deter-
mined. Such edge effects bring about unreliable results in regions called the cone of
influence in the time-frequency plane.
3.2 Empirical results
Studies in the literature consider the displacement effect and Wagner’s law to hold
over the long run, but not at all time. This indicates that we need to investigate
low-frequency rather than high-frequency components. Thus, we report the results
by focusing on long-run frequencies, which are defined as frequencies lower than
8-year cycles in this study.8 Because of the cone of influence, the maximum cycle
length of the present long-run frequencies is 32 years. In what follows, although
we omit the coherency and phase difference calculated for frequencies higher than
8-year cycles, they are highly volatile over time and are not informative.
Figure 3 shows the wavelet coherency and phase difference betweenGY and PCY
for each country. The coherency results are shown on the upper panel of Figure 3
for each country. Note that the cone of influence is described as white lines and the
results outside the lines are incredible. The phase difference results are shown on
the lower panel. To capture the local relationships across time and frequencies and
understand the results, we calculate the phase difference for two divided frequency
bands: the cycles of periodicity between 8 and 16 years, and those between 16 and
32 years. The shaded area depicts the development stages. Moreover, Figure 4
shows the wavelet power spectrum of GY . We use the ASToolbox proposed by Luis
Aguiar–Conraria and Maria Joana Soares for calculating wavelet measures.
Australia
Until the mid-1950s, a large high coherency region exists in the long-run (16–32
year) frequency band, although it is partly under the effect of the cone of influence.
Importantly, from the beginning to the middle of the 20th century, the phase differ-
ence calculated for the 16–32 year frequency band is consistently located between
−pi/2 and 0, suggesting that the leading variable is PCY . This indicates that PCY
determines GY in this period, implying that the law holds. Moreover, while the
coherency is low from 1920 to the late 1960s, the phase difference calculated for the
8–16 year frequency band is generally between −pi/2 and 0. These findings reveal
8Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) and others consider business cycle frequencies as between 1.5
and 8 years. Hence, we define lower frequencies as long-run frequencies.
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a structural break validating Wagner’s law until the late 1960s (i.e., in the upper
middle income stage), especially until the mid-1950s, but the law does not hold from
the late 1960s to the present day (i.e., in the high income stage) in Australia.
This revelation is consistent with the findings of Chang et al. (2004), who exam-
ine the causal relationship between income and government spending over the period
1951 to 1996 in Australia but find no evidence in favor of the law. As pointed out
by Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) and Kuckuck (2014), such a structural change in
phase difference indicates that the validity of the law is weakened in the advanced
stage of development in Australia as well. In particular, when detecting structural
breaks, the subsample periods based on the World Bank’s income group definitions
adopted in Kuckuck (2014) are likely to be roughly appropriate to the case of Aus-
tralia.
The wavelet power spectrum of GY indicates a significant region at the 16–
32 year frequency band around the World War II period. Although we cannot
understand the case of World War I owing to the cone of influence stemming from
lack of sample period, this supports the displacement effect during the World War
II period in Australia. However, since a significant region of the power spectrum
coincides with that of coherency, we determine that the long-run growth in GY is
primarily due to Wagner’s law in Australia.
Canada
One can confirm that generally coherency is low in the long run in Canada, but at
the 10% significance level in the 8–16 year frequency band, a few high coherency
regions can be found: from 1890 to 1900, from 1910 to 1930, and from the mid-1970s
to the mid-1980s.9
In the first high coherency phase in the last part of the 19th century, a phase
difference is located between −pi and −pi/2, suggesting strong negative correlation.
Since the phase difference between −pi/2 and 0 does not remain stable by the early
1900s, we determine that the law is unlikely to hold roughly during the lower middle
income stage. In the second high coherency phase from 1910 to 1930, the phase
difference is between −pi/2 and 0. Furthermore, in the third high coherency phase
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the phase difference is positive. Over the
period from 1880 to the late 1950s, the phase difference for the 8–16 year frequency
band is persistently located between −pi/2 and 0. Despite the cone of influence in
the recent decades, it moves between 0 and pi/2 after the late 1950s. Thus, the
validity of the law is weakened in Canada ahead of the threshold of the high income
9A large significant region exists in the recent decades, but it is subject to the cone of influence.
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stage in 1970.
From the results for the 16–32 year frequency band, high coherency regions exist
from 1930 to 1950. However, on the whole, the phase difference calculated for the
16–32 year frequency band moves persistently between 0 and pi/2. Thus, we find no
evidence of the law in the 16–32 year frequency band.
In summary, compared to Australia, Wagner’s law holds at higher frequencies
(cycles of periodicity between 8 and 16 years) in Canada. Further, from the above-
mentioned findings, the law for Canada is validated roughly during the upper middle
income stage. However, the valid phase is more strictly in the period up to the mid-
1950s, implying that mis-specifications could arise from cointegration analyses on
subsamples divided by the World Bank’s income group definitions, as in Kuckuck
(2014). Considering the high coherency, we provide strong evidence of the law
particularly during the period from 1910 to 1930.
The results are consistent with Chang et al. (2004), who examine the relationship
between income and public expenditure in Canada for the more recent period from
1951 to 1996 and find no evidence of the law.10
On the other hand, at lower frequencies (16–32 year frequency band), the wavelet
power spectrum of GY indicates a significant region covering the wars and the Great
Depression. More precisely, the World War I period is not included in the significant
region at the 5% level. This implies that, as a visual inspection of Figure 2 would
show, the displacement effect appears to be smaller through World War I than
through World War II and the Great Depression in Canada. The most important
point that can be confirmed at this point is that the frequencies at the significant
region of the power spectrum are lower than those at which Wagner’s law is valid,
implying that the displacement effect can account for much of the growth in GY in
Canada in the 20th century.
Chile
To the best of our knowledge, few studies have tested Wagner’s law for Chile so
far, but some results emerge. First, a region with significant coherency is located
between 1910 and 1920 at long-run frequencies corresponding to cycles of periodicity
between 8 and 16 years. In the 8–16 year scales, the phase difference lies between
−pi/2 and 0 from 1910 to 1920, indicating that Wagner’s law is particularly valid
in this decade. Second, a large region of statistically significant coherency can be
found at the same frequency band for the period from 1960 to 1980. However, the
10On the other hand, our results do not support the findings of Ahsan et al. (1996), who limit
the period to 1953–1988 and find that the law is valid in Canada. However, as stated by Chang et
al. (2004), this finding could be due to the fewer samples observed, and seems open to question.
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phase difference in the periodicity between 8 and 16 years is lower than −pi/2 for
these two decades, suggesting negative relationship between the two variables. After
the mid-1990s, the phase difference is again located between −pi/2 and 0. Further,
at longer-run frequencies (corresponding to cycles of periodicity between 16 and 32
years), the phase difference is generally between −pi/2 and 0 from 1930 to 1980. In
summary, the law seems valid in Chile especially around the mid-20th century.
The wavelet power spectrum exhibits no significant region in the long run, but
this does not mean that the displacement effect is rejected in Chile. Most impor-
tantly, as one would realize from Figure 2, a sudden increase in GY is unlikely to
be observed in Chile. Thus, we cannot test the displacement effect in Chile.
Denmark
At frequencies corresponding to cycles of periodicity between 8 and 16 years, a large
high coherency region exists in the period from the early 1930s to the mid-1950s,
but the phase difference is outside the range between −pi/2 and 0. On the other
hand, from the phase difference for longer frequencies (corresponding to cycles of
periodicity between 16 and 32 years), PCY seems to be leading from 1930 to 1980
on the whole. Although no high coherency can be observed at longer frequencies,
these results support the law in Denmark only in this half a century (from 1930 to
1980).
Our outcomes support Kuckuck’s (2014) findings of weak evidence of the law in
the high income stage and provide more detailed description on the following aspects.
First, our findings roughly support the law in the upper middle income stage (from
1908 to 1968), as suggested in Kuckuck (2014), and show that the validity changes
over time even within the upper middle income stage in a precise sense. That is,
from the present endogenously detected time span, the law is validated not from
1908, but from 1930. Second, weak evidence of the law is indicated not only in the
high income stage, but also before 1930 and in the lower middle income stage.
One can find no strong support for the displacement effect in Denmark because
no particularly high power spectrum exists around the war period and the Great
Depression. Relatively high power can be found after 1975, consistent with the
rapid increase in GY , as can be seen in Figure 2. These findings imply that the
displacement effect is not a dominant cause of the growth in government size over
the past century.
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Finland
Around the 1910s, a significant region of coherency exists at 8–16 year periodicities,
but the corresponding phase difference is positive and the law is unlikely to hold.
Coherency takes relatively high values from the late 1930s to the mid-1970s at cycles
between 8 and 16 years. The phase difference calculated for the 8–16 year frequency
band lies between −pi/2 and 0 only in this period. The phase difference calculated
for the 16–32 year frequency band is generally located outside the range.
As for Denmark, we support Kuckuck’s (2014) findings, but the period support-
ing the law turns out to be narrower than the upper middle income stage (from 1937
to 1978). We also find that the validity of the law emerges stronger in the middle
of the sample period in Finland as well.
A high power spectrum can be seen at long-run frequency especially around the
World War II period in Finland, but it is not significant. This provides formal evi-
dence supporting the simple inspection of Figure 2 and shows that the displacement
effect dominates the growth in Finnish government size over the past century. More
importantly, a high power emerges at 16–32 year frequencies and does not overlap
high coherency regions. Thus, for the most part, the growth in GY appears to be
accounted for by the displacement effect in Finland.
Italy
In Italy, two significant high coherency regions exist at cycles between 8 and 16
years: from 1900 to 1920, and from the mid-1930s to the early 1950s. The latter is
relevant to Wagner’s law, because the phase difference calculated for the 8–16 year
frequency band is persistently negative from 1930 to 1960. These results for the
8–16 year frequency band are important to understand Kuckuck’s (2014) indication
that Wagner’s law is less validated in the high income stage from 1978. Throughout
the period, at longer-run frequencies between 16 and 32 years, the phase difference
ranges generally between −pi/2 and 0, but the extent to which GY and PCY are
linked changes over time. This means that at longer-run frequencies, coherency is
relatively high from 1900 to 1960. In summary, the validity of the law emerges
stronger in the middle of the sample period in Italy as well.
Since a significant region of the power spectrum is large and appears at long-
run frequencies until roughly 1970, we cannot obtain conclusive evidence of the
displacement effect. However, from Figure 2, the displacement effect seems to be
supported around the World War II period, at least in Italy. In comparison with the
frequencies at which Wagner’s law is strongly supported, the significant region of the
power spectrum is located in different regions. This suggest that the displacement
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effect is the primary factor behind the growth of GY in Italy.
Mexico
After the mid-1960s, a large region of significant coherency exists at long-run fre-
quencies between 16 and 32 years, although partly from the effect of the cone of in-
fluence in recent decades. This period coincides with the upper middle income stage
from 1964. At these long-run frequencies, the phase difference is between −pi/2 and
0 over 1940–2000. We cannot obtain informative results at higher frequencies at cy-
cles between 8 and 16 years because the corresponding phase differences frequently
change over time.
These results support the well-cited paper of Mann (1980), who tests Wagner’s
law for Mexico over a maximum period, from 1925 to 1976. As far as the Musgrave
version is concerned (using GY and PCY ), Mann provides stronger evidence of the
law in the subsample period from 1941 to 1976 than for the full sample from 1925
to 1976. Considering the structural change around 1940, as mentioned above, we
can understand Mann’s findings. Moreover, Iniguez-Montiel (2010) suggests that
the law is valid for more recent times from 1950 to 1999. This is consistent with our
findings indicating strong validity of the law after the mid-1960s.
A relatively high power spectrum can be found at long-run frequencies after 1975
in Mexico. As for Chile, no large disturbances can be observed in GY as depicted
in Figure 2. Thus, we cannot test the displacement effect in Mexico. However, since
the high power region coincides with that of coherency, Wagner’s law appears to
explain the growth in GY especially around the 1970s.
Sweden
Four significant high coherency regions can be found in the long run for Sweden.
The first phase before 1830 is irrelevant because the phase difference is positive.
On the other hand, at low frequencies between 8 and 32 years, the phase difference
is approximately between −pi/2 and 0 from the early 1840s to the early 1960s. In
addition to Kuckuck’s (2014) indication that Wagner’s law is less validated in the
high income stage from 1969, the validity is also weak in the first half of the 19th
century. This is consistent with Durevall and Henrekson (2011), who analyze long-
term data from the early 19th century and find that the law holds only between
roughly 1860 and the mid-1970s.
Note that from our results, the extent to which the data are consistent with the
law depends on time even during the period from 1860 to the mid-1970s. Recalling
the three significant regions with high coherency during this period, we can conclude
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that the strongest evidence is obtained in more local periods from 1850 to 1880. In
the other significant phases, the law is rejected from 1900 to 1920 and from the
mid-1930 to 1950 because the phase difference is less than −pi/2.
A slightly high power spectrum can be observed in Sweden during the period
covering two social disturbances, the Great Depression and World War II. This is
consistent with Figure 2, and it turns out that the displacement effect occurs owing
to the two disturbances. Since Wagner’s law is not supported in the first half of
the 20th century, it is highly likely that the displacement effect plays a crucial role
during in period.
The United Kingdom
In the long run, a significant large region of high coherency is found in the long run
from the close of the 19th century to the early 1960s. This period coincides roughly
with the upper middle income stage from 1885 to 1972. Moreover, phase differences
are persistently between −pi/2 and 0 during the upper middle income stage.
These findings support the positive evidence provided by Gyles (1991), Oxley
(1994), Chang (2002), and Chang et al. (2004), all of them using observations
included in the upper middle income stage. We also confirm that Wagner’s law is
less validated in the high income stage from 1973, as indicated in Kuckuck (2014),
and find that the validity is also weak in the lower middle income stage.
While our results agree with Durevall and Henrekson’s (2011) findings, which
show that the law holds between roughly 1860 and the mid-1970s, we can extract
more detailed evidence from the coherency. That is, the significant region of the
coherency suggests that the law is particularly validated in more local periods span-
ning from the mid-1890s until 1960. This region spreads throughout the 8–32 year
frequency band.
The power spectrum is significantly high at long-run frequencies around the in-
terwar periods. The significant region is large especially during the World War I
period. As seen in Figure 2, the displacement effect is larger in the World War I
period than in the World War II period in the United Kingdom. Moreover, from
Figure 2 we infer that it is unlikely that the significant power stemming from the
displacement effect comes from the Great Depression. In comparison with the sig-
nificant region of coherency, high power emerges at lower frequencies. Thus, we can
determine that the displacement effect rather than Wagner’s law contributes to the
growth in GY , reinforcing the findings of Peacock and Wiseman (1961).
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The United States
With regard to coherency, while one observes a significant region at all frequencies in
recent decades, relatively high values are found intermittently in the long run before
the close of the 20th century. Before the high income stage except for the period
from 1880 to 1890, the phase difference calculated for the 8–16 year frequency band
is persistently located between −pi/2 and 0.
These results support the findings of Islam (2001), who limits the period to
1929–1996 and finds positive evidence of the law. During a large part of this period,
the phase difference for the 8–16 year frequency band is between −pi/2 and 0, and
the effects are reflected in Islam’s results. However, our results also suggest the
possibility that the time period covered by Islam leads to failure of the appropriate
test. That is, the selected period includes a structural break around 1970 and picking
a subsample that ends in 1970 seems appropriate for Islam’s analysis.
In the U.S. case, as Figure 2 shows, besides World War I, World War II, and the
Great Depression, the U.S. Civil War could be relevant to the displacement effect.
In the power spectrum, high power regions at long-run frequencies can in fact be
found when all the large social disturbances occur. Unlike in other countries, the
displacement effect due to the Great Depression can be very large in the United
States. Moreover, the frequencies of the high power regions turn out to be different
from Wagner’s law frequencies. Thus, the displacement effects are more dominant
than the law in the United States.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to distinguish between Wagner’s law and the displace-
ment effect, both of which purport to explain the remarkable growth in government
size in the past few centuries, using wavelet analysis. Cumulative evidence for the
OECD countries seems to justify the conclusion that Wagner’s law is supported for
limited periods and that the long-run growth in government size cannot be ade-
quately explained by the law. However, the displacement effect can account for the
bulk of the long-run growth in government size in Canada, Finland, Italy, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
While the evidence of Wagner’s law is mixed in previous works, our wavelet
results of coherency and phase difference are useful to redress this situation. We
find numerous differences in timing and valid duration of the law among the OECD
countries. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
First, our wavelet coherency results show that the law is validated for limited
periods in all the ten countries. The extent to which the data are consistent with the
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law depends on the time, even for limited periods. Moreover, such timings of struc-
tural breaks vary considerably between countries. This can be a potential reason for
the inconsistent results of previous studies, most of which probably analyzed vari-
ous countries and periods without careful attention to the treatment of structural
breaks.
Importantly, previous works specify the period to which the law is valid, but
we find that the validity is changing even for specified periods. In other words, the
wavelet coherency procedure reveals more local breaks than previous studies point
out. We therefore emphasize that the law should be explored with greater care for
structural breaks than treatments as in previous studies.
Second, in addition to such minute structural changes, our phase difference re-
sults indicate that similar patterns appear for most of the OECD countries, although
several countries cannot be investigated due to lack of historical observations. Specif-
ically, the validity of the law tends to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern with eco-
nomic development in most of the OECD countries. That is, the law is less valid in
the earliest stage of economic development as well as in the advanced stages. While
the outcomes for Sweden and the United Kingdom confirm the findings of Durevall
and Henrekson (2011), the outcomes for other countries form new evidence.
Third, our wavelet results show the frequency at which the law holds dominantly,
based on which we classify the ten OECD countries into three groups. Canada,
Chile, Finland, Italy, and Sweden form the first group, for whom strongest support
for the law is observed in the 8–16 year frequency band. Australia, Denmark, and
Mexico form the second group, for whom strongest support is confirmed in a longer
frequency band (i.e., the 16–32 year frequency band). The third group consists of
the United Kingdom and the United States. Strongly positive evidence supports
the law for the entire frequency band in the long run (i.e., the 8–32 year frequency
band).
Although this study demonstrates the importance of Wagner’s law and the dis-
placement effect, the two hypotheses obviously cannot fully account for the long-run
growth in government size. Thus, additional explanations need to be pursued in a
future research.
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Table 1: Country coverage and income stage
Country Observations Coverage Lower middle Upper middle High
income stage income stage income stage
Australia 109 1901-2009 -1871 1872-1969 1970-2009
Canada 140 1870-2009 1870-1904 1905-1969 1970-2009
Chile 150 1860-2009 1860-1945 1946-2004 2005-2009
Denmark 130 1880-2009 1880-1907 1908-1968 1969-2009
Finland 128 1882-2009 1882-1936 1937-1978 1979-2009
Italy 148 1862-2009 1862-1938 1939-1977 1978-2009
Mexico 93 1917-2009 1917-1963 1964-2009 —
Sweden 210 1800-2009 1800-1924 1925-1968 1969-2009
UK 180 1830-2009 1830-1884 1885-1972 1973-2009
US 210 1800-2009 1800-1891 1892-1962 1963-2009
Long-run increase
Period of crisis
Short-run increase
Time
Government size
Figure 1: Displacement effect in the short and long run
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Figure 2: Share of government expenditure in GDP (GY ) and real income per capita
(PCY ) for ten OECD countries
Notes: The shaded areas depict the three development stages (lower middle income, upper
middle income, and high income).
22
Australia
Pe
rio
d 
(y
ea
rs)
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
8
16
32
Canada
Pe
rio
d 
(y
ea
rs)
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
8
16
32
Chile
Pe
rio
d 
(y
ea
rs)
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
8
16
32
Denmark
Pe
rio
d 
(y
ea
rs)
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
8
16
32
Figure 3: Coherency and phase difference between the share of government expen-
diture in GDP and GDP per capita
Notes: The upper panels depict the coherency ranges from blue (low coherency) to red (high
coherency). The gray and black contours represent the 10% and 5% significance levels,
respectively. The white line represents the cone of influence. The lower panels show the phase
difference; the shaded area depicts the three development stages (lower middle income, upper
middle income, and high income).
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Figure 3: Coherency and phase difference between share of government expenditure
in GDP and GDP per capita (Continued)
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Figure 3: Coherency and phase difference between share of government expenditure
in GDP and GDP per capita (Continued)
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Figure 4: Wavelet power spectrum of government expenditure in GDP (GY ) for ten
OECD countries
Notes: The power spectrum ranges from blue (low power) to red (high power). The gray and
black contours represent the 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. The white dashed lines
represent the maxima of the power spectrum. The white line represents the cone of influence.
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